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Abstract
We consider a fair division model in which agents
have general valuations for bundles of indivisible
items. We propose two new axiomatic properties
for allocations in this model: EF1± and EFX±. We
compare these with the existing EF1 and EFX. Al-
though EF1 and EF1± allocations often exist, our
results assert eloquently that EFX± and PO alloca-
tions exist in each case where EFX and PO alloca-
tions do not exist. Additionally, we prove several
new impossibility and incompatibility results.
1 Introduction
We study fair division problems where agents have general
(i.e. positive, zero or negative) valuations for bundles of in-
divisible items. Some items are marginally advantageous for
agents. We call these goods. Item o is a good for agent i with
respect to bundle M if the i’s marginal valuation for o when
added to M is non-negative. Other items are marginally dis-
advantageous for agents. We call these bads. Item o is a bad
for agent i with respect to bundle M if the i’s marginal val-
uation for o when added to M is non-positive. We consider
three item types depending on combinations of valuations.
We refer to item o as mixed if, there is a pair of agents i, j
and a pair of disjoint bundles M,N such that the marginal
valuation of i for o when added to M is strictly positive and
the marginal valuation of j for o when added to N is strictly
negative. Also, we refer to item o as generally good for agent
i if o is good for i wrt any bundle M . Likewise, we refer to
item o as generally bad for agent i if o is bad for i wrt any
bundle M . Thus, we consider three problem types depending
on available items.
The first type of problems has only items that are gener-
ally good and generally bad for agents. In other words, each
agent consider a given item as generally good or generally
bad. From a theoretical perspective, this could be the case
whenever we combine a problem with goods and a problem
with bads. From a practical perspective, any problem where
the valuations are additive (i.e. the agent’s valuation for a bun-
dle of items is the sum of their valuations for the items in
the bundle) has only generally good items and generally bad
items. Popular such applications are paper assignments, food
allocations, course allocations, etc.
Although such problems capture various common settings,
there are other practical settings where none of the items is
generally good/bad for anyone. We show this in Example 1.
Example 1. Alice and Bob love playing cricket but they have
only one ball b and one racket r. Let them value {b, r} at 2,
{b} and {r} at−1, and ∅ at 0. Giving Alice b in addition to r
makes her happy because she gets utility 2 but giving her only
b makes her unhappy because she gets utility−1. This means
that her judgment about whether b is good or bad depends
on whether she receives r or not. Hence, neither b nor r is
considered as generally good/bad by Alice or Bob. 
This leads us to the other two problem types. The sec-
ond type has no mixed items and capture settings where all
agents reach a consensus about whether a given item is good
or bad with respect to their bundles. For instance, a group
of friends all agree to go on a holiday or not given their bud-
gets. The third type has items that could be arbitrary (i.e.
possibly mixed) and capture settings such as the one in Exam-
ple 1. Both types model complementarities or substitutabili-
ties. Say, I value the right and left shoes together and have no
value for just one shoe. Also, I value my bicycle but disvalue
a second one due to the lack storage space in my basement.
An interesting case in our setting is when the agents’ val-
uations are general but identical (i.e. for each bundle, the
agents’ valuations are equal). For example, people tend to
have a similar value for a pair of Nike shoes but perhaps this
value differs from their value for a pair of Adidas shoes. Fur-
ther, computer science students at TU Berlin tend to value
one module (i.e. a set of courses) identically (e.g. by means
of ECTS credits) but they may value differently another mod-
ule. We will shortly observe that the three sets of problems
relate as in Figures 1 and 2.
Figure 1: Taxonomy of problems with general valuations.
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Figure 2: Taxonomy of problems with identical general valuations.
An (complete) allocation exhausts all items by giving to
each agent a different bundle. For allocations in these prob-
lems, we study approximations of the golden standard in fair
division: envy-freeness (i.e. no agent envies another one) [Fo-
ley, 1967]. Two such existing properties for our setting are
EF1 and EFX [Aziz et al., 2019]. For example, EFX requires
that, if agent i envies agent j, 1) removing any item from
agent i’s bundle, that is non-zero-valued bad for agent i wrt
agent i’s bundle, makes agent i envy-free of agent j, and 2)
removing any item from agent j’s bundle, that is non-zero-
valued good for agent i wrt agent j’s bundle, makes agent i
envy-free of agent j. EF1 is a weaker property that relaxes
the EFX conditions to some (possibly zero-valued) and not
any (non-zero-valued) item.
We propose in our work two alternative properties. Both
of them aim at restoring envy-freeness by reducing the valua-
tions of envied agents. This can happen either through remov-
ing goods from their bundles or adding bads to these bundles.
For this purpose, we refer to them as EFX± and EF1±. For
example, EFX± requires that, if agent i envies agent j, 1)′
adding to agent j’s bundle any item from agent i’s bundle,
that is non-zero-valued bad for agent i wrt agent i’s bundle,
makes agent i envy-free of agent j, and 2)′ removing any item
from agent j’s bundle, that is non-zero-valued good for agent
i wrt agent i’s bundle, makes agent i envy-free of agent j. In
a similar fashion, we propose to consider a weaker version -
EF1± - that relaxes the EFX± conditions to some item and
not any item.
The idea of reducing the valuation of an envied agent by
adding to their bundle a bad from an envy agent’s bundle is
already used in the literature [Chen and Liu, 2020]. Further,
EFX requires that each removed item from the envied agent’s
bundle is non-zero-valued good for the envy agent wrt the en-
vied agent’ bundle. However, such an item could still be bad
for the envy agent wrt their own bundle. For this reason, we
believe that this requirement is counter-intuitive as we would
expect the envy agent to be happy that such a bad is not in
their own bundle but in the envied agent’s bundle. In contrast,
the novelty about EFX± is that it requires that each removed
item from the envied agent’s bundle is non-zero-valued good
for the envy agent wrt their own bundle.
We also study combinations of each of these fairness prop-
erties with efficiency in allocations. A classical efficiency
notion is Pareto-optimality (PO) [Pareto, 1897]. Pareto-
optimality ensures that we cannot re-distribute items among
agents’ bundles in such a way so that we make every agent
weakly happier and some agent strictly happier. Thus, we
compare in our work various combinations of properties.
For example, we will observe several similarities between
the new EF1±, EFX± and the existing EF1, EFX. One such
is for the additive case. In this case, an allocation is EFX
(EF1) iff it is EFX± (EF1±). Furthermore, EF1 and EF1±
allocations exist in problems with 2 agents and general (not
just identical) valuations. We will also prove some major dif-
ferences between the new and the existing fairness properties.
We remark that EFX might be unachievable and it is unknown
whether EF1 is achievable in problems with identical general
valuations [Be´rczi et al., 2020]. In contrast, an EFX ± (and,
hence, EF1±) and PO allocation exists in this and other cases.
We give further motivation via an example.
2 Motivation
Many applications of fair division in practice are concerned
with issues such as privacy and anonymity of the participants
taking part in the allocation. Typical examples are school
choice, conference paper assignment, voting, task assignment
and course allocation problems.
Indeed, we may want a system that does not reveal knowl-
edge about the preferences to the public. At TU Berlin, it has
been observed that this increases the dissatisfaction of both
students and staff members because it generates jealousy and
complaints. We next capture this in Example 2.
Example 2. Consider students X and Y who wish to enrol
in university courses 1, 2, 3 and 4, supposing there is one
empty spot in each course. Let 1 be a seminar class and 2, 3, 4
lecture classes. We let the students value a module of 1 course
with 6 ECTS credits, a module of 3 courses with 12 ECTS
credits and a module of 4 courses with 18 ECTS credits.
Furthermore, we let the valuations of students for modules
of 2 courses depend on whether these are lectures and/or sem-
inars. Suppose that combining the seminar class with any lec-
ture class into a module does not give additional credits to the
students (i.e. 6 credits) while combining two lecture classes
into a module gives 3 additional credits (i.e. 9 credits).
Assigning X to the seminar class and Y to the three lecture
classes gives 6 credits to X and 12 credits to Y. This outcome
is EFX± and PO, but not EFX. By comparison, assigning X
to the seminar class and a lecture class and Y to two lecture
classes gives 6 credits to X and 9 credits to Y. This outcome is
EFX and EFX± but not PO. 
If the central planner reveals the preferences of X and Y,
then X would be able to compare their valuations with those
of student Y. For this reason, the EFX allocation in which
each of X and Y is assigned to a module of 2 courses might
be preferred. But, this outcome is not PO.
Otherwise, X would not be able to compare their valuations
with the valuations of Y. As a result, the EFX± allocation in
which X is assigned to a module of 1 course and Y is assigned
to a module of 3 courses might be preferred. Additionally,
this one satisfies PO.
Notably, achieving EFX± guarantees that each student get
at least as much as they would get when achieving EFX. This
is because EFX± can often be combined with PO. Indeed, the
valuations of each of X and Y in the EFX± allocation are at
least as much as their valuations in the EFX allocation.
property agents problems with problems without problems witharbitrary items mixed items gen. good/bad items
identical general valuations
EFX ≥ 2 ×, (Thm 1) open open
EFX (∃) & EFX± ≥ 2 ×, (Thm 2)
EFX (∃) & PO ≥ 2 ×, (Thm 3)
EFX± & PO ≥ 2 X, leximin (Thm 4)
general valuations
EFX± 2 X, (Cor 1)
EFX± & PO 2 × (Cor 2)
EFX± & PO (d.n.v.) 2 X, leximin (Thm 5)
EF1 2 X, [Be´rczi et al., 2020]
EF1 & PO 2 ×, (Thm 6) open open
EF1± & PO 2 ×, (Cor 3) open open
EF1±, EF1 ≥ 3 open open open
Table 1: Key: X-possible, ×-not possible (non-zero marginal valuations), ∃-EFX allocations, d.n.v.-disjointly normalised valuations.
3 Our contributions
We emphasise in our work on possibility and impossibility
results. Table 1 contains our and some existing results. Even
though we close interesting major cases, we leave some open
questions for future work.
• For general but identical valuations, an EFX allocation
might be unachievable or incompatible (Theorems 1- 3).
• For general but identical valuations, an EFX± and PO
allocation exists (Theorem 4).
• For general but disjointly normalised valuations and 2
agents, an EFX± and PO allocation exists (Theorem 5).
• For general valuations, an EF1 and PO allocation might
not exist (Theorem 6). We note that this compatibility
remains an open problem with additive valuations.
• Finally, we make additionally several minor contribu-
tions (Corollaries 1- 3).
We feel that our theoretical results provide further moti-
vation for using EF1± and EFX± instead of EF1 and EFX.
EF1± is often achievable when EF1 is, and EFX± and PO
are achievable in cases when EFX and PO are not.
4 Related work
For indivisible goods, EF1 was proposed by Budish [2011]
and EFX by Caragiannis et al. [2016]. For our setting, they
were generalized by Aziz et al. [2019]. They gave the double
round-robin algorithm for computing EF1 allocations in prob-
lems with additive valuations. Plaut and Roughgarden [2018]
proved that a stronger version of EFX (labelled as EFX0 in
[Kyropoulou et al., 2019]) can be satisfied in problems with
general but identical valuations for goods (i.e. generally good
items). By comparison, we prove that EFX± and PO allo-
cations exist in each problem with such valuations for mixed
manna. We also give problems with identical general valua-
tions for mixed manna where EFX (and, therefore, EFX and
PO) allocations might not exist even when the marginal valu-
ations are non-zero.
Chen and Liu [2020] considered problems with generally
good/bad items. They proposed the following variant of EFX:
if agent i envies agent j, adding to agent j’s bundle any item
from agent i’s bundle, that is generally bad for agent i, makes
agent i envy-free of agent j, and removing any item from
agent j’s bundle, that is generally good for agent i, makes
agent i envy-free of agent j. In our setting, there are prob-
lems where each mixed item is not generally good/bad for
anyone (see Example 1). For this reason, this variant is well-
defined only for problems with generally good/bad items.
They showed that their variant and PO are compatible under
the identical and non-zero marginal assumptions. We illus-
trate that this breaks whenever we drop the latter assumption.
Moreover, EFX± is well-defined for all problems.
Very recently, Be´rczi et al. [2020] showed that EFX (la-
belled as EFX+−) allocations may not exist in problems with
identical general valuations whose marginals could be zero.
From this perspective, our impossibility result about EFX un-
der the non-zero marginal assumption is stronger. They also
showed that a stronger version of EFX (i.e. EFX+0 ) can be
satisfied in problems with general but identical valuations for
bads (i.e. generally bad items). They observed a similar re-
sult for the case of 2 but dropping the identical assumption.
However, we discuss later that adding goods to the problem
may destroy a natural generalization of EFX+0 even when the
number of agents is 2 and the valuations are identical. Also,
none of their results includes PO as some of our results.
Recently, Aleksandrov [2020] confirmed that EFX and PO
allocations exist in problems with 2 agents and normalised
(i.e. the total valuation is equal) additive valuations for mixed
manna. This is an important case because it is practical. For
example, some web-applications on Spliddit ask agents to
share a pre-defined total valuation for items [Caragiannis et
al., 2016]. We give a similar result for EFX± and PO allo-
cations under the assumption of general but disjointly nor-
malised (i.e. the valuation of each partition is equal) valua-
tions for mixed manna. We also note that EFX allocations
exist in problems with 3 agents and additive valuations for
goods [Chaudhury et al., 2020]. However, the case of 4 or
more agents in such problems remains open.
5 Formal preliminaries
In this section, we give the formal preliminaries for our anal-
ysis: model, problems, properties and solutions. We also con-
firm the set taxonomies in Figures 1 and 2.
5.1 Model
We let [n] denote a set of agents and [m] denote a set of in-
divisible items, where n,m ∈ N≥2. Further, we let each
i ∈ [n] use some function vi to specify their general valuation
vi(M) ∈ R for each M ⊆ [m]. We write vi(o) for vi({o}).
The valuation vi(M) is additive if vi(M) =
∑
o∈M vi(o).
The marginal valuations are non-zero if, for each i ∈ [n], each
o ∈ [m] and each M ⊆ [m]\{o}, vi(M ∪{o})−vi(M) 6= 0.
The valuations identical if, for each M ⊆ [m], vi(M) =
vj(M) for each i, j ∈ [n]. We write then v(M).
We refer to item o as mixed if, there is a pair of agents i, j
and a pair M ⊆ [m] \ {o}, N ⊆ [m] \ (M ∪ {o}) such that
vi(M ∪ {o}) > vi(M) and vj(N ∪ {o}) < vj(N) hold. We
refer to item o as good for agent i wrt M ⊆ [m] if vi(M ∪
{o}) ≥ vi(M). We refer to item o as generally good for agent
i if o is good for i wrt each M ⊆ [m]. We refer to item o as
bad for agent i wrt M ⊆ [m] if vi(M ∪ {o}) ≤ vi(M). We
refer to item o as generally bad for agent i if o is bad for i wrt
each M ⊆ [m].
In a problem with arbitrary items, some items could be
mixed. In a problem without mixed items, there are no such
items. An item now can be good for everyone in one alloca-
tion (i.e. their marginal valuations are non-negative) and bad
for everyone in another allocation (i.e. their marginal valua-
tions are non-positive). Also, some item could be good for
everyone and another item could be bad for everyone in the
same allocation. In a problem with generally good/bad items,
an item that is good/bad for some agent in a given allocation
is also good/bad for them in any other allocation.
5.2 Problem taxonomy
Example 1 is a witness where each item is mixed and no item
is generally good/bad for anyone. However, in problems with
general valuations, a mixed item can be generally good for
one agent and generally bad for another agent (see Figure 1).
Observation 1. Even with additive (not necessarily identi-
cal) valuations, there are problems with generally good and
generally bad items, in which some items are mixed.
Proof. Let us consider a problem with 2 agents and the
valuations: v1(a) = 3, v1(b) = −1 and v2(a) = 1, v2(b) =
1. We focus on item b. This item is mixed because of v1(∅ ∪
{b}) < v1(∅) and v2({a}∪{b}) > v2({b}). However, item b
is generally bad for agent 1 - v1(b) < v1(∅) and v1({a, b}) <
v1(a) - and generally good for agent 2 - v2(b) > v2(∅) and
v2({a, b}) > v2(b). 
By comparison, in problems with identical general valu-
ations, an item that is generally good/bad for some agent is
also generally good/bad for each other agent. Hence, such an
item cannot be mixed (see Figure 2).
Observation 2. With general but identical valuations, a
problem with generally good and generally bad items is also
a problem without mixed items.
Proof. Let us consider an allocation A = (A1, . . . , An).
Pick some item with non-zero marginal valuation for some
agent. Wlog, o ∈ A1. If v(A1) − v(A1 \ {o}) > 0, then
o is good for every agent simply because the valuations are
identical. Since the problem is with generally good items,
it follows that o ∈ Gi holds for each i ∈ [n]. But, then
v(Aj ∪ {o}) − v(Aj) ≥ 0 holds for each j ∈ [n] \ {1}. If
v(A1)−v(A1 \{o}) < 0, then o is bad for every agent. Since
the problem is with generally bad items, it follows that o ∈ Bi
holds for each i ∈ [n]. But, then v(Aj ∪ {o}) − v(Aj) ≤ 0
holds for each j ∈ [n] \ {1}. Finally, each remaining item is
such that the marginal valuation of any agent for it is zero. 
In a problem with identical additive valuations, there are
no mixed items. Also, an item is good/bad for an agent in any
allocation. Hence, this is a problem with generally good/bad
items. This might be untrue in general (see Figure 2).
Observation 3. With identical general valuations, there are
problems without mixed items, in which some items are not
generally good or generally bad for any agent.
Proof. Consider 2 agents and the valuations v(∅) = 0,
v(a) = 1, v(b) = 1, v(c) = 3, v(d) = 1, v({a, b}) = 2,
v({a, c}) = 2, v({a, d}) = 2, v({b, c}) = 2, v({b, d}) =
2, v({c, d}) = 2, v({a, b, c}) = 4, v({b, c, d}) = 4,
v({a, b, d}) = 1.5, v({a, c, d}) = 4 and v({a, b, c, d}) = 5.
We note that there are no mixed items in this problem: for
each o ∈ {a, b, c, d} and S, T ⊆ {a, b, c, d} \ {o} such that
S ∩ T = ∅ and S ∪ T = {a, b, c, d} \ {o}, at most one of the
two holds: (1) v(S ∪ {o}) > v(S) and v(T ∪ {o}) > v(T )
or (2) v(S ∪ {o}) < v(S) and v(T ∪ {o}) < v(T ).
We also note that item a is good inA = ({a, b}, {c, d}) and
bad inB = ({a, c}, {b, d}): u1(A1)−u1(A1\{a}) = 1 > 0,
u2(A2 ∪{a})− u2(A2) = 2 > 0, u1(B1)− u1(B1 \ {a}) =
−1 < 0 and u2(B2 ∪ {a}) − u2(B2) = −0.5 < 0. Hence,
item a is not generally good/bad for any of the agents. 
5.3 Axiomatic properties
An (complete) allocation A = (A1, . . . , An) is such that (1)
Aa is the bundle of agent a ∈ [n], (2) ∪a∈[n]Aa = [m] and
(3) Aa ∩ Ab = ∅ for each a, b ∈ [n] with a 6= b. We write−→v (A) ∈ Rn for the non-decreasing valuation vector wrt A.
Envy-freeness up to one removed good/removed bad We
first define the existing approximations EF1 and EFX.
Definition 1. (EF1) An allocation A is envy-free up to some
removed good or some removed bad if, ∀i, j ∈ [n] s.t. i envies
j, 1) ∃o ∈ Aj s.t. vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj \ {o}) or 2) ∃o ∈ Ai s.t.
vi(Ai \ {o}) ≥ vi(Aj).
Definition 2. (EFX) An allocation A is envy-free up to any
non-zero removed good and any non-zero removed bad if,
∀i, j ∈ [n] s.t. i envies j, 1) ∀o ∈ Aj s.t. vi(Aj) >
vi(Aj \ {o}): vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj \ {o}) and 2) ∀o ∈ Ai s.t.
vi(Ai) < vi(Ai \ {o}): vi(Ai \ {o}) ≥ vi(Aj).
An allocation that satisfies EFX also satisfies EF1. It is
well-known that the opposite relation may not be true even
with additive valuations.
EFX ⇒ EF1
Envy-freeness up to one removed good/added bad We
further define the novel approximations EF1± and EFX±.
Definition 3. (EF1±) An allocation A is envy-free up to
some removed good or some added bad if, ∀i, j ∈ [n] s.t.
i envies j, 1)′ if ∃o ∈ Aj s.t. vi(Ai ∪ {o}) > vi(Ai), then
vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj \ {o}), or 2)′ if ∃o ∈ Ai s.t. vi(Ai) <
vi(Ai \ {o}), then vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj ∪ {o}).
Definition 4. (EFX±) An allocation A is envy-free up to
any non-zero removed good and any non-zero added bad if,
∀i, j ∈ [n] s.t. i envies j, 1)′ ∀o ∈ Aj s.t. vi(Ai ∪ {o}) >
vi(Ai): vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj \ {o}) and 2)′ ∀o ∈ Ai s.t.
vi(Ai) < vi(Ai \ {o}): vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj ∪ {o}).
An allocation that is EFX± also satisfies EF1±. With addi-
tive valuations, an allocation is EFX± iff it is EFX. Also, it is
EF1± iff it is EF1. This follows because at least one item in
the envy agent’s bundle or the unenvied agent’s bundle gener-
ates an increase in the valuation of the envy agent. Therefore,
an allocation that is EF1± may violate EFX±.
EFX± ⇒ EF1±
Pareto-optimality As we mentioned earlier, we also con-
sider a classical efficiency criterion such as Pareto-optimality.
Definition 5. (PO) An allocation A is Pareto-optimal if there
is no allocation B that Pareto-improves A, i.e. ∀i ∈ [n]:
vi(Bi) ≥ vi(Ai) and ∃j ∈ [n]: vj(Bj) > vj(Aj).
5.4 The leximin solution
We consider the leximin solution from [Dubins and Spanier,
1961]. This one maximizes the minimum utility of any agent
in an allocation, subject to which the second minimum utility
is maximized, and so on.
Plaut and Roughgarden [2018] implemented one total op-
erator for comparing allocations: . We write A  B (i.e. A
leximin-dominates B) if there exits an index i ≤ n such that−→v (A)j = −→v (B)j for each 1 ≤ j < i and −→v (A)i > −→v (B)i.
Thus, the leximin solution is a maximal element under. We
note that there could be multiple leximin solutions.
They observed that this solution is trivially PO, since if it
were possible to improve the valuation of one agent without
decreasing the valuation of any other agent, the new alloca-
tion would be strictly larger under .
6 EFX: identical general valuations
We start with the standard EFX property. Interestingly, this
property might be incompatible with EFX± or PO even in
problems where the agents’ valuations are identical. This
is either because EFX allocations might not exist or because
they minimize the valuation of any agent.
6.1 Problems with arbitrary items: impossibility
We prove the first major result. There are problems in our
setting, where none of the allocations is EFX even under the
non-zero marginal assumption. The key rationale behind this
is the fact that these problems may contain mixed items.
Theorem 1. There are problems with mixed items and iden-
tical general valuations whose marginals are non-zero, in
which no allocation is EFX.
Proof. Consider a problem with 2 agents and 4 items.
Define the valuations as follows: v(∅) = 0, v(a) = 5,
v(b) = 5, v(c) = 5, v(d) = 5, v({a, b}) = 6, v({a, c}) = 3,
v({b, c}) = 3, v({a, d}) = 6, v({b, d}) = 6, v({c, d}) =
3, v({a, b, c}) = 7, v({a, b, d}) = 8, v({a, c, d}) = 7,
v({b, c, d}) = 7 and v({a, b, c, d}) = 9. Clearly, these valua-
tions are identical.
We claim that this is a problem with mixed items. To con-
firm this, we need to find a single mixed item. For this pur-
pose, we consider the leximin solution A = ({c}, {a, b, d}).
In this allocation, item a is bad for agent 1 wrt A1 (i.e.
v(A1 ∪ {a}) − v(A1) = 3 − 5 = −2 < 0) but good for
agent 2 wrt A2 (i.e. v(A2)− v(A2 \ {a}) = 8− 6 = 2 > 0).
This confirms our claim.
We can now conclude that the problem is indeed with
mixed items. We next show that none of the allocations in it
is EFX. For this purpose, we consider all allocations in which
agent 1 receive a different bundle and give one violation of
this property per allocation. By the symmetry of the valua-
tions, one can show that the corresponding allocations where
agents swap bundles also violate EFX.
• A = (∅, {a, b, c, d}): v(A1) = 0, v(A2) = 9, v(A2) −
v(A2 \ {c}) = 1 and v(A1) = 0 < 8 = v(A2 \ {c})
• A = ({a}, {b, c, d}): v(A1) = 5, v(A2) = 7, v(A2) −
v(A2 \ {c}) = 1 and v(A1) < 6 = v(A2 \ {c})
• A = ({b}, {a, c, d}): v(A1) = 5, v(A2) = 7, v(A2) −
v(A2 \ {c}) = 1 and v(A1) < 6 = v(A2 \ {c})
• A = ({c}, {a, b, d}): v(A1) = 5, v(A2) = 8, v(A2) −
v(A2 \ {d}) = 2 and v(A1) < 6 = v(A2 \ {d})
• A = ({d}, {a, b, c}): v(A1) = 5, v(A2) = 7, v(A2) −
v(A2 \ {c}) = 1 and v(A1) < 6 = v(A2 \ {c})
• A = ({a, b}, {c, d}): v(A1) = 6, v(A2) = 3, v(A1) −
v(A1 \ {a}) = 1 and v(A2) < 5 = v(A1 \ {a})
• A = ({a, c}, {b, d}): v(A1) = 3, v(A2) = 6, v(A2) −
v(A2 \ {b}) = 1 and v(A1) < 5 = v(A2 \ {b})
• A = ({b, c}, {a, d}): v(A1) = 3, v(A2) = 6, v(A2) −
v(A2 \ {d}) = 1 and v(A1) < 5 = v(A2 \ {d}) 
This result compares favorably with the existence of EFX
allocations in the case of identical additive valuations [Alek-
sandrov and Walsh, 2020]. However, it remains an open prob-
lem whether such allocations exist with arbitrary (i.e. not just
identical) additive utilities.
We also draw two interesting conclusions. First, the lex-
imin solution might violate EFX in problems with mixed
items and identical general valuations whose marginals are
non-zero. Second, EFX and PO, or EFX and EFX± cannot
generally be achieved in such problems.
6.2 Problems without mixed items: incompatibility
One might hope that removing the mixed items in a given
problem will help us restore some of the incompatibility re-
sults for EFX. However, our next pair of findings thwart this
hope. They hold for problems with generally bad items and
also for problems without mixed items (see Figure 2).
Theorem 2. There are problems with generally bad items
and identical general valuations whose marginals are non-
zero, in which no EFX allocation satisfies EFX±.
Proof. Consider 2 agents, 4 items and the identical val-
uations: v(∅) = 0, v(a) = −4, v(b) = −4, v(c) = −4,
v(d) = −6, v({a, b}) = −5, v({a, c}) = −5, v({b, c}) =
−5, v({a, d}) = −7, v({b, d}) = −7, v({c, d}) = −7,
v({a, b, c}) = −8, v({a, b, d}) = −8, v({a, c, d}) = −8,
v({b, c, d}) = −8 and v({a, b, c, d}) = −9.
We argue that the way to achieve the axiomatic quarantees
of EFX is to give {a, b, c} to agent 1 and {d} to agent 2, or
to swap these bundles. For each other allocation, one can
find a violation of this property as in Theorem 1. However,
the allocation A = ({a, b, c}, {d}) violates EFX±: v(A1) =
−8 < −7 = v(A2 ∪ {a}). 
We conclude that the set of EFX allocations and the set of
EFX± allocations might be disjoint in some problems even
under the non-zero marginal assumption. As a result, there
are problems where none of the EFX± allocations is EFX.
Further, Plaut and Roughgarden [2018] proved that the
leximin solution is EFX and PO in problems with general
but identical valuations for goods (i.e. generally good items),
subject to the non-zero marginal assumption. Interestingly,
adding bads to the problem may destroy this compatibility.
Theorem 3. There are problems with generally bad items
and identical general valuations whose marginals are non-
zero, in which no EFX allocation satisfies PO.
Proof. Consider again the problem from Theorem 2.
The only two EFX allocations in this problem are A =
({d}, {a, b, c}) and B = ({a, b, c}, {d}). Pick also the al-
locations C = ({a, b}, {c, d}) and D = ({c, d}, {a, b}).
Each of these is the leximin solution. Further, we have that
v(C1) = −5 > −6 = v(A1), v(C2) = −7 > −8 = v(A2),
v(D1) = −7 > −8 = v(B1), v(D2) = −5 > −6 = v(B2)
hold. Hence, C/D Pareto-improves A/B. 
This result has the following insightful implication. That
is, there are problems where all EFX allocations minimize
the maximum valuation of any agent. This suggests that any
approach that maximizes the minimum valuation of any agent
might fail to deliver any EFX guarantees.
7 EFX± and PO: identical general valuations
We further analyse the new EFX± property. We prove the
second major result. That is, EFX± and PO allocations ex-
ist in each problem in our setting as long as the agents’ val-
uations are general but identical. For example, the leximin
solution is EFX± and PO.
Theorem 4. With general but identical valuations, the lex-
imin solution satisfies EFX± and PO.
Proof. Let A be an leximin++ allocation. This allocation
is PO even with general (and not necessarily identical) valua-
tions. For this reason, we next show that A is EFX±. Assume
that A is not EFX± for a pair of agents i, j ∈ [n] with i 6= j.
That is, v(Ai) < v(Aj).
For our proof, we let v(A1) ≤ . . . ≤ v(An) denote the
utility order induced by A. We also let k = argmax{h ∈
[n]|v(Ah) ≤ v(Ai)}. We note that i ≤ k and k < j hold.
Thus, we can conclude that v(Ai) = v(Ak) and v(Ak) <
v(Aj) hold.
The violation of EFX± further means that at least one of
the following two conditions should hold: (a) ∃o ∈ Aj :
v(Ai∪{o}) > v(Ai), v(Ai) < v(Aj \{o}) and (b) ∃o ∈ Ai :
v(Ai) < v(Ai\{o}), v(Ai) < v(Aj∪{o}). We consider two
cases depending on which of (a) or (b) holds.
Case 1: If (a) holds for some o ∈ Aj , then let us move
only item o from Aj to Ai. We let B denote this allocation:
Bi = Ai ∪ {o}, Bj = Aj \ {o} and Bh = Ah for each
h ∈ [n] \ {i, j}. We next prove that B  A holds.
Wlog, let v(Bp1) ≤ . . . ≤ v(Bpn) denote the utiity order
induced by B. We note that the positions of agents i and j
in this order are at least k. As a result, Bpq = Aq for each
q ∈ {1, . . . , k} \ {i}.
We now consider three cases for the kth agent in this order.
If pk = i, we derive v(Bi) = v(Ai ∪ {o}) > v(Ai) by (a). If
pk = j, we also derive v(Bj) = v(Aj \ {o}) > v(Ai) by (a).
If pk = k+1, we conclude v(Bk+1) = v(Ak+1) > v(Ak) ≥
v(Ai) by the construction of B and the choice of k.
To conclude this case, we simple observe that v(Bpq ) ≥
v(Bpk) > v(Ai) holds for each q ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n}. Gather-
ing the pieces together, it follows thatA cannot be the leximin
solution. This is a contradiction. Hence, (a) cannot hold.
Case 2: If (b) holds for some o ∈ Ai, then let us move
only item o from Ai to Aj . We let B denote this allocation:
Bi = Ai \ {o}, Bj = Aj ∪ {o} and Bh = Ah for each
h ∈ [n] \ {i, j}. We again prove that B  A holds.
Consider again the utiity order induced by B, say
v(Bp1) ≤ . . . ≤ v(Bpn). The positions of agents i and j
in this order are also at least k. As a result, Bpq = Aq for
each q ∈ {1, . . . , k} \ {i}.
The cases for the kth agent are similar as in the first case.
If pk = i, we derive v(Bi) = v(Ai \ {o}) > v(Ai) by (b). If
pk = j, we also derive v(Bj) = v(Aj ∪{o}) > v(Ai) by (b).
If pk = k+1, we conclude v(Bk+1) = v(Ak+1) > v(Ak) ≥
v(Ai) by the construction of B and the choice of k.
At the end, we again observe that v(Bpq ) ≥ v(Bpk) >
v(Ai) holds for each q ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n}. Consequently, the
allocation A cannot be the leximin solution. This leads again
to a contradiction. Therefore, (b) also cannot hold. 
8 EFX±: general valuations
It is well-known that the egalitarian allocation, maximizing
the minimum valuation of any agent, might fail EF1 in prob-
lems with 3 agents and additive valuations [Caragiannis et al.,
2016]. This holds for the leximin solution and EF1± in this
case. For this reason, we study the case of 2 agents.
8.1 The case of 2 agents
We come to the third major result. This one is for general but
disjointly normalised valuations. That is, for each M,N ⊆
[m] such thatM∩N = ∅ andM∪N = [m], we have vi(M)+
vi(N) = c for each i ∈ [2] and some c ∈ R. Interestingly,
each problem with such valuations admits an EFX± and PO
allocation.
Theorem 5. With general (not just identical) but disjointly
normalised valuations, the leximin solution satisfies EFX±
and PO allocation.
Proof. Let A be the leximin solution. Clearly, A is PO.
Suppose that A is not EFX±. Wlog, let agent 1 be not EFX±
of agent 2. Hence, it must be the case that (a) v1(A1) <
v1(A2 ∪ {o}) holds for some o ∈ A1 with v1(A1 \ {o}) >
v1(A1) or (b) v1(A1) < v1(A2 \ {o}) holds for some o ∈ A2
with v1(A1 ∪ {o}) > v1(A1). We consider two cases.
If (a) holds for o ∈ A1, let us consider bundles S1 = A1 \
{o} and S2 = A2 ∪ {o}. If (b) holds for o ∈ A2, let us
consider bundles S1 = A1 ∪ {o} and S2 = A2 \ {o}. We
construct an allocation B that leximin-dominates A, reaching
a contradiction. We let B1 = argminS v2(S) and B2 =
argmaxS v2(S) where S ∈ {S1, S2}.
By construction, v2(B2) ≥ v2(B1) holds in B. Moreover,
v1(S1) > v1(A1) and v1(S2) > v1(A1) hold in each of the
cases (a) and (b). These inequalities follow because agent
1’s marginal valuations for the moved item are non-zero and
agent 1 is not EFX± of agent 2. We conclude v1(B1) >
v1(A1).
We have v1(A1) + v1(A2) = c and v2(A1) + v2(A2) = c
for some c ∈ R by A1 ∩ A2 = ∅ and the fact that the val-
uations are disjointly normalised. As v1(A1) < v1(A2), it
follows v1(A1) < c/2. By the PO of A, v2(A2) > v2(A1).
Hence, v2(A1) < c/2 and v2(A2) > c/2. This implies
v1(A1) < v2(A2).
Further, the allocation B is also such that B1 ∩ B2 = ∅
holds. Therefore, v2(B1) + v2(B2) = c. As v2(B2) ≥
v2(B1), it follows that the inequality v2(B2) ≥ c/2 holds.
We now derive the contradiction: min{v1(A1), v2(A2)} =
v1(A1) < min{v1(B1), c/2} ≤ min{v1(B1), v2(B2)}. 
A special but very common and practical sub-case of dis-
jointly normalised valuations is the one when the valuations
are additive and normalised, i.e. vi([m]) = c for i ∈ {1, 2}
and some c ∈ R. Nevertheless, we might wish to drop the as-
sumption of disjointly normalised valuations and achieve just
EFX±, or even additionally PO.
On the plus side, we can give a “cut-and-choose” proto-
col for returning an EFX± allocation: (1) agent 1 “cut” the
bundle of items in two, using the leximin solution and sup-
posing that agent 2 have identical valuations, and (2) agent
2 “choose” their most favorable bundle. A similar idea was
used by Plaut and Roughgarden [2018] for EFX and goods.
By Theorem 4, it follows that agent 1 is EFX± for each
bundle after the cut. As agent 2 pick their most favorable bun-
dle, they are envy-free of agent 1. This concludes our claim.
The interesting part about this simple result in contrast to the
one in Theorem 5 is that agents can have general valuations
that might not necessarily be disjointly normalised.
Corollary 1. With 2 agents and general (not just identical)
valuations, an EFX± allocation exists.
On the minus side, both properties might be incompati-
ble. Plaut and Roughgarden [2018] proved a similar result for
EFX0 and PO in problems with 2 agents and generally good
items under the non-zero marginal assumption. We simply
note that EFX0 coincides with our EFX± in this case because
of the non-zero marginal assumption.
Corollary 2. There are problems with generally good items
and general but not identical valuations whose marginals are
non-zero, in which no EFX± allocation satisfies PO.
9 EF1 and PO: general valuations
We turn attention to the weaker EF1 property. We note that
the compatibility between EF1 and PO remains an open ques-
tion with additive valuations. However, there are very simple
problems in our setting where each EF1 allocation violates
PO. This is our fourth major result.
Theorem 6. There are problems with arbitrary items and
general but not identical valuations whose marginals are
non-zero, in which no EF1 allocation satisfies PO.
Proof. Consider 2 agents and 4 items. We define the valua-
tions as follows: v1(∅) = v2(∅) = 0, v1(S) = v2(S) = 3 for
S with |S| = 3 and v1(S) = v2(S) = 4 for S with |S| = 4.
For S with |S| = 1, v1(S) = −1 and v2(S) = 1. For S with
|S| = 2, v1(S) = −2 and v2(S) = 2.
To achieve EF1, agent 1 cannot get a bundle with 3 or 4
items. If they got such a bundle, then agent 2 got a bundle
with at most 1 item. But, then agent 2’s valuation would be
at most 1 and agent 2’s valuation for agent 1’s bundle be at
least 3. Removing an item from agent 1’s bundle or agent 2’s
bundle would not eliminate the envy of agent 2.
Consequently, it must be the case that agent 1 get zero, one
or two items. If they got no item, their valuation for their
own bundle would be 0 and their valuation for the bundle of
agent 2 be 4. Again, removing an item from agent 2’s bundle
would not eliminate this envy because v1(S) = 3 for each S
with |S| = 3.
Hence, agent 1 should get one item or two items. If they
got one item, the agents’ valuations are −1 and 3. If they got
two items, the agents’ valuations are −2 and 2. We note that
each of these is EF1. However, it is easy to see that these are
Pareto dominated by the valuations 0 and 4, i.e. agent 1 get
no item and agent 2 get all items. 
This result gives us another reason to focus on EF1±. The
other reason for this was that it is unknown whether EF1 al-
locations exist in problems with 3 or more agents and identi-
cal general valuations [Be´rczi et al., 2020]. By comparison,
EF1± and PO allocations exist in this case by Theorem 4.
10 EF1±: general valuations
We lastly sum up some observations for the new EF1± prop-
erty. We observe that each EF1 allocation in the problem
from Theorem 6 also satisfies EF1± and no other allocation
is EF1±. It follows immediately that EF1± and PO might be
incompatible in some problems in our setting.
Corollary 3. There are problems with arbitrary items and
general but not identical valuations whose marginals are
non-zero, in which no EF1± allocation satisfies PO.
We note that this impossibility result is in-line with the pos-
sibility result in Theorem 5 simply because the valuations in
the problem from Theorem 6 are not disjointly normalised.
Therefore, the two results do not contradict but complement
each other.
By Corollary 1, an EF1± allocation also exists in each
problem with 2 agents and general valuations. We believe
that this complements nicely the recent possibility result of
Be´rczi et al. [2020] who proved that an EF1 allocation exists
in each such problem.
Finally, Aziz et al. [2019] presented the double round-
robin algorithm for returning an EF1 allocation in problems
with additive valuations. In such problems, recal that an allo-
cation is EF1 iff it is EF1±. Hence, their algorithm returns an
EF1± allocation in this case.
11 Discussion
We considered a stronger variant of EFX± where the agents’
marginal valuations are allowed to be zero, say EFX±0 . With
additive valuations for goods, this is EFX0 from [Kyropoulou
et al., 2019]. With additive valuations for bads, it is EFX+0
from [Be´rczi et al., 2020]. Aleksandrov and Walsh [2020]
generalized EFX0 to the case of additive valuations for goods
and bads when it coincides with EFX±0 . Thus, they gave prob-
lems with 2 agents and identical additive valuations where
none of the allocations satisfies EFX±0 .
We also considered two other variants of envy-freeness up
to any item. The first one uses condition 1)′ in the defini-
tion of EFX± and condition 2) in the definition of EFX. The
impossibility result in Theorem 1 holds for this variant. The
second variant uses condition 1) in the definition of EFX and
condition 2)′ in the definition of EFX±. The incompatibil-
ity result in Theorem 3 holds for this variant. This perhaps
suggests that EFX± is the “right” notion for our model.
Finally, we observed that the variant of EFX from [Chen
and Liu, 2020] cannot be combined with PO even in problems
with generally good items. To see this, consider 2 agents and
the identical valuations v({a, b}) = 2, v(a) = 1, v(b) = 0
and v(∅) = 0. To achieve PO, we should give {a, b} to one of
the agents. Wlog, letA = ({a, b}, ∅). This allocation violates
Chen and Liu’s variant of EFX: v(A1)−v(A1\{b}) = 1 > 0
and v(A2) = 0 < 1 = v(A1 \ {b}).
12 Conclusion
We considered a fair division model in which agents have
general valuations for bundles of items. We proposed two
new axiomatic properties for allocations in this model: EF1±
and EFX±. We compared these with two existing properties:
EF1 and EFX. Table 1 contains our results. Although EF1 and
EF1± allocations exist with 2 agents, these results suggest
that EFX± and PO allocations are compatible in each case
where EFX and PO allocations are incompatible. We also
proved some interesting impossibility results: (1) an EFX al-
location might not exist even under the non-zero marginal as-
sumption and (2) an EF1 and PO allocation might also not
exist in general.
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